The Second Sex

The Second Sex

Simone de Beauvoir

Description:

The essential masterwork that has provoked and inspired generations of men and women. “From Eve’s apple to Virginia Woolf’s room of her own, Beauvoir’s treatise remains an essential rallying point, urging self-sufficiency and offering the fruit of knowledge.” —VogueThis unabridged edition reinstates significant portions of the original French text that were cut in the first English translation. Vital and groundbreaking, Beauvoir’s pioneering and impressive text remains as pertinent today as when it was first published, and will continue to provoke and inspire generations of men and women to come.

Review

The Second Sex is the most ambitious and comprehensive philosophical treatise on the condition of women ever written. Published in 1949, Simone de Beauvoir's eight-hundred-page work operates simultaneously as an encyclopedic survey of biology, psychoanalysis, and historical materialism; a panoramic history of women from prehistory to the mid-twentieth century; an anatomy of the myths men have constructed around femininity; and a phenomenological account of what it actually feels like to grow up, live, love, and age as a woman. This unabridged translation by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier restores the philosophical precision and the sometimes brutal candor that H. M. Parshley's 1953 abridgment softened or excised. What emerges is a work more demanding and more rewarding than the earlier English edition suggested—a book that is genuinely philosophical, not merely polemical, and whose central insights remain unsettlingly current.

The architecture of the book is itself an argument. Volume I, "Facts and Myths," proceeds through three stages of demolition. Part One, "Destiny," examines and rejects three frameworks that claim to explain women's subordination as natural or inevitable. In the chapter on biological data, Beauvoir provides a meticulous survey of reproductive physiology across species, arguing that while biological differences between the sexes are real, they carry no inherent hierarchy. The female is not the passive, inferior complement to the active male that centuries of philosophical tradition assumed. She does not deny that the burdens of gestation fall disproportionately on the human female, but she insists that "in the human species nature can never be separated from artifice"—that the meaning we assign to biological facts is always a cultural and political choice. The chapter on psychoanalysis engages seriously with Freud, crediting him for grasping sexuality as a dimension of existence while rejecting his tendency to treat femininity as a failed masculinity. Beauvoir objects that the psychoanalytic account of "penis envy" confuses a social situation with a biological destiny: the girl does not envy the penis itself but the sovereignty it symbolizes. The chapter on historical materialism gives Engels his due for linking women's oppression to the rise of private property, but argues that economic determinism alone cannot account for the existential dimension of women's subordination—their reduction to the status of the Other.

This last concept, introduced in the masterful Volume I Introduction, is the philosophical spine of the entire work. Drawing on Hegel's master-slave dialectic, Lévi-Strauss's structural anthropology, and Sartre's existentialist ontology (while subtly departing from all three), Beauvoir argues that man has constituted himself as Subject and Absolute by positing woman as Other. Unlike the proletariat or colonized peoples, women have never formed an independent group that could organize collective resistance; they are dispersed among men, bound to them by ties of kinship, desire, and economic dependence. "They have no past, no history, no religion of their own," she observes, and their very lack of solidarity is what makes their oppression so durable. This analysis—concise, lucid, and philosophically rigorous—remains the single most important contribution of the book. It established a framework that every subsequent feminist thinker has had to engage with.

Part Two, "History," traces the condition of women from nomadic tribes through ancient civilizations, the Middle Ages, the French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution to the present. Beauvoir's erudition here is staggering, covering Roman law, medieval gynecology, the querelle des femmes, suffragist movements across multiple countries, Soviet labor policy, and the Napoleonic Code. She is particularly incisive on the paradoxes of progress: the French Revolution, she notes, "respected bourgeois institutions and values" and did essentially nothing for women. The Napoleonic Code "sealed her fate for a century" by codifying marital subordination as law. The chapter concludes with a powerful thesis: "women's entire history has been written by men." Feminism itself "has never been an autonomous movement" but rather "an epiphenomenon reflecting a deeper social drama." This is not defeatism but a demand that women's liberation be understood as part of a total transformation of social relations.

Part Three, "Myths," is perhaps the most original section of Volume I. In three chapters, Beauvoir anatomizes the images of woman that men have projected onto the screen of their own anxieties and desires. Woman as Nature, as Mother, as Virgin, as temptress, as muse, as idol, as sphinx—all these are exposed as products of male ambivalence toward flesh, mortality, and the freedom of the Other. Chapter 2 provides extended literary analyses of five male writers—Montherlant, D. H. Lawrence, Claudel, Breton, and Stendhal—measuring each against the standard of reciprocity. Only Stendhal, she argues, treats women as genuine subjects. The final chapter on myth drives home the political function of mystification: "The myth of Woman substitutes for an authentic relationship with an autonomous existent the immobile contemplation of a mirage." The "eternal feminine" is a Platonic Form that never had any earthly substance, but its power to distort perception—of women by men, and of women by themselves—is enormous.

Volume II, "Lived Experience," is where the book earns its claim to be philosophy rather than sociology. Beauvoir walks through the stages of a woman's life—childhood, girlhood, sexual initiation, marriage, motherhood, maturity, old age—not as a catalog of grievances but as a phenomenology of situated existence. The writing here is often extraordinary. The chapter on childhood traces, with clinical precision, the moment when the little girl learns that her body is not a tool for action but an object for others' gaze. The chapter on the girl describes the devastating double bind of adolescence: the girl is told she must attract men to justify her existence, but every gesture of self-assertion risks repelling them. "Far from destining herself to man because she thinks she is inferior to him, it is because she is destined for him that, in accepting the idea of her inferiority, she constitutes it."

The chapter on sexual initiation is unflinching. Beauvoir describes the asymmetry of the sexual act—how it requires woman to "consent to passivity" in ways that conflict with her sense of autonomy—without either condemning sexuality or romanticizing it. She is equally honest about lesbian experience, treating it not as pathology but as "one way among others for woman to solve the problems posed by her condition in general and by her erotic situation in particular." The chapter on the married woman is devastating in its portrait of how the institution of marriage converts a free human being into a domestic functionary: "she perpetuates the immutable species, she ensures the even rhythm of the days and the permanence of the home she guards with locked doors." Beauvoir's description of housework as Sisyphean labor—repetitive, unproductive, invisible—anticipates decades of feminist domestic critique.

The chapter on motherhood is among the bravest in the book. Beauvoir insists on discussing abortion at length, documenting the hypocrisy of a society that criminalizes the procedure while tacitly depending on it (she estimates one million abortions per year in France, roughly equal to the number of births). She argues that forced motherhood produces neither good mothers nor healthy children, and that "the law that dooms young women to death, sterility, and illness is totally powerless to ensure an increase of births." Her account of pregnancy itself is richly ambivalent: she captures both the "beatitude of the woman great with child" and the existential strangeness of carrying within one's body a being that is simultaneously self and other. She refuses to sentimentalize: "The mother can have her reasons for wanting a child, but she cannot give to this other—who tomorrow is going to be—his own raisons d'être."

Part Three of Volume II, "Justifications," examines the psychological strategies women adopt when denied genuine freedom: narcissism, romantic love, and religious mysticism. The chapter on the woman in love is a tour de force of psychological analysis, tracing the dialectic by which devotion becomes tyranny, worship becomes resentment, and the attempt at self-transcendence through another person collapses into solitude. "Authentic love must be founded on reciprocal recognition of two freedoms," she writes, but the existing situation makes such reciprocity nearly impossible: "the woman in love experiences the bitterest of solitudes." The chapter on mysticism draws startling parallels between erotic and religious experience, arguing that both represent attempts to transcend a condition of fundamental dependency.

The final chapter, "The Independent Woman," and the Conclusion form Beauvoir's positive argument. She is bracingly honest about the difficulties facing women who pursue economic and intellectual independence: the double burden of professional and domestic work, the sexual double standard, the subtle ways in which a woman's "femininity" is weaponized against her ambitions. "The woman embarks on a career in the context of a highly problematic situation," she writes, "subjugated still by the burdens traditionally implied by her femininity." She notes that the independent woman often suffers from an inferiority complex that leads to excessive caution, defeatism, or compensatory aggression—not because of innate incapacity but because "her education did not give her either the taste or the habit of independence."

The Conclusion articulates a vision of genuine equality that is neither utopian fantasy nor reformist incrementalism. Beauvoir calls for a world in which "men and women would be equal"—not identical, but peers in freedom—through economic independence, reproductive autonomy, collective responsibility for children, and above all, a revolution in consciousness. She anticipates the objection that equality will destroy romance: "it is when the slavery of half of humanity is abolished and with it the whole hypocritical system it implies that the 'division' of humanity will reveal its authentic meaning and the human couple will discover its true form." The final pages are among the most moving in twentieth-century philosophy.

The weaknesses of The Second Sex are real but should not be overstated. Beauvoir's treatment of non-Western women is sketchy and sometimes orientalist. Her account of biology, while careful for 1949, has been superseded in many details. Her attitude toward the female body oscillates between philosophical detachment and a visceral repugnance that some readers find alienating—though one might argue this reflects the very ambivalence she is trying to diagnose. Her occasional reliance on dubious psychoanalytic case studies weakens some arguments in Volume II. And her insistence that economic transformation is a necessary but insufficient condition for liberation can feel frustrating in its refusal to specify exactly what else is required, beyond the suggestive phrase "an inner metamorphosis."

But these are the limitations of any work that attempts to say everything about a subject that touches every domain of human life. The achievement of The Second Sex is not that it answered all the questions but that it posed them with a rigor, a scope, and an existential urgency that no previous thinker had approached. The central argument—that woman's subordination is not a biological fact but an existential situation, maintained by institutions, myths, and the complicity of the oppressed—has become so widely accepted that it is difficult to remember how revolutionary it was. The famous sentence "One is not born, but rather becomes, woman" is not a slogan but the condensation of a philosophical argument that unfolds across eight hundred pages of relentless analysis. It remains the indispensable starting point for any serious thinking about sex, gender, and human freedom.

Reviewed 2026-04-25

Notable Quotes

One is not born, but rather becomes, woman.

Volume II Introduction, the book's most famous sentence and thesis statement, arguing that femininity is not a biological given but a social construction — gender construction, existentialism, identity, socialization

Humanity is male, and man defines woman, not in herself, but in relation to himself; she is not considered an autonomous being.

Volume I Introduction, establishing the foundational asymmetry: man is the Subject, the Absolute; woman is the Other — alterity, patriarchy, subjectivity, the Other

Her body is not enough to define her; it has a lived reality only as taken on by consciousness through actions and within a society; biology alone cannot provide an answer to the question that concerns us: why is woman the Other?

End of the Biological Data chapter, the pivotal rejection of biological determinism as explanation for women's subordination — biology, embodiment, social construction, phenomenology

A society is not a species: the species realizes itself as existence in a society; it transcends itself toward the world and the future; its customs cannot be deduced from biology; individuals are never left to their nature; they obey this second nature, that is, customs in which the desires and fears that express their ontological attitude are reflected.

Biological Data chapter, arguing that human existence always exceeds biological fact through culture and history — nature vs. culture, transcendence, ontology, human nature

It is not the body-object described by scientists that exists concretely but the body lived by the subject. The female is a woman, insofar as she feels herself as such.

Opening of the Psychoanalytical Point of View chapter, endorsing psychoanalysis's insight that lived experience, not objective anatomy, constitutes femininity — phenomenology, lived body, subjectivity, psychoanalysis

The woman who frees herself from it nevertheless wants to conserve its prerogatives; and the man then demands that she assume its limitations. 'It is easier to accuse one sex than to excuse the other,' says Montaigne.

Conclusion, on the vicious circle where both sexes are complicit in perpetuating femininity as a trap — complicity, liberation, bad faith, double bind

The fact of being a human being is infinitely more important than all the singularities that distinguish human beings; it is never the given that confers superiority: 'virtue,' as the ancients called it, is defined at the level of 'what depends on us.'

Conclusion, Beauvoir's ethical summation that human worth lies in freedom and action, not biological endowment — humanism, equality, ethics, freedom

The same drama of flesh and spirit, and of finitude and transcendence, plays itself out in both sexes; both are eaten away by time, stalked by death, they have the same essential need of the other; and they can take the same glory from their freedom; if they knew how to savor it, they would no longer be tempted to contend for false privileges; and fraternity could then be born between them.

Final passage of the Conclusion, Beauvoir's vision of genuine reciprocity between the sexes — reciprocity, freedom, fraternity, existential equality

It is through work that woman has been able, to a large extent, to close the gap separating her from the male; work alone can guarantee her concrete freedom.

Opening of The Independent Woman chapter, asserting that economic autonomy is the necessary foundation of liberation — work, economic independence, liberation, autonomy

All oppression creates a state of war. This particular case is no exception. The existent considered as inessential cannot fail to attempt to reestablish his sovereignty.

Conclusion, on why women's resistance to subordination is not aberrant but inevitable — oppression, resistance, sovereignty, freedom

The conflict will last as long as men and women do not recognize each other as peers, that is, as long as femininity is perpetuated as such.

Conclusion, diagnosing the structural source of the battle of the sexes: not nature, but the institution of femininity — gender conflict, equality, femininity as institution, reciprocity

She is not the plaything of contradictory drives; she devises solutions that have an ethical hierarchy among them. Replacing value with authority, choice with drives, psychoanalysis proposes an ersatz morality: the idea of normality.

Psychoanalytical Point of View chapter, Beauvoir's existentialist critique of Freudian determinism — freedom, choice, psychoanalysis critique, existentialist ethics

No man would consent to being a woman, but all want there to be women.

Myths chapter, exposing the asymmetry at the heart of gender: men value femininity in others precisely because they would not accept it for themselves — asymmetry, privilege, myth of femininity, male gaze

Woman is the victim of no mysterious fate; the singularities that make her different derive their importance from the meaning applied to them; they can be overcome as soon as they are grasped from new perspectives.

Conclusion, rejecting biological determinism and affirming that reinterpretation can liberate — anti-determinism, meaning, liberation, perspective

It is always difficult to describe a myth; it does not lend itself to being grasped or defined; it haunts consciousnesses without ever being posited opposite them as a fixed object.

Opening of the Myths chapter, on the elusive nature of the myths that constitute the 'eternal feminine' — myth, ideology, consciousness, the eternal feminine

The whole education conspires to bar her from paths of revolt and adventure; all of society—beginning with her respected parents—lies to her in extolling the high value of love, devotion, and the gift of self and in concealing the fact that neither lover, husband, nor children will be disposed to bear the burdensome responsibility of it.

Conclusion, on how women are educated into passivity through a conspiracy of benevolent lies — education, socialization, self-sacrifice, mystification

She readily lets herself count on the protection, love, help, and guidance of others; she lets herself be fascinated by the hope of being able to realize her being without doing anything. She is wrong to yield to this temptation; but the man is ill advised to reproach her for it since it is he himself who tempted her.

Conclusion, on how complicity in oppression is produced by the oppressor's own arrangements — bad faith, complicity, temptation, structural oppression

What is unique about the pregnant woman is that at the very moment her body transcends itself, it is grasped as immanent: it withdraws into itself in nausea and discomfort; it no longer exists for itself alone and then becomes bigger than it has ever been.

The Mother chapter, a phenomenological account of pregnancy as an experience of radical ambiguity between transcendence and immanence — pregnancy, embodiment, transcendence, immanence

The man who sees himself as obligated to maintain a woman he no longer loves materially and morally feels he is a victim; but if he abandoned without resources the one who has committed her whole life to him, she would be a victim in an equally unjust manner. The wrong does not come from individual perversity—and bad faith arises when each person attacks the other—it comes from a situation in the face of which all individual behavior is powerless.

Conclusion, on how structural injustice produces conflicts that no individual goodwill can resolve — structural injustice, marriage, dependence, bad faith

To do great things, today's woman needs above all forgetfulness of self: but to forget oneself one must first be solidly sure that one has already found oneself.

The Independent Woman chapter, on why professional excellence requires a self-confidence that women's upbringing systematically undermines — self-confidence, creativity, independence, self-discovery

The curse on the woman vassal is that she is not allowed to do anything; so she stubbornly pursues the impossible quest for being through narcissism, love, or religion; when she is productive and active, she regains her transcendence; she affirms herself concretely as subject in her projects.

The Independent Woman chapter, explaining how inactivity drives women toward substitutes for genuine self-realization — transcendence, work, narcissism, subjectivity

If we suppose, by contrast, a society where sexual equality is concretely realized, this equality would newly assert itself in each individual.

Conclusion, arguing that individual transformation requires collective transformation: 'The forest must be planted all at once' — collective change, equality, individual freedom, social transformation

Useless, unjustified, she contemplates these long years without promise she still has to live and murmurs: 'No one needs me!'

From Maturity to Old Age chapter, on the crisis facing the aging woman whose identity was built entirely around her roles as wife and mother — aging, purpose, dependence, existential crisis

It is not enough to change laws, institutions, customs, public opinion, and the whole social context for men and women to really become peers.

Conclusion, cautioning that formal legal equality is necessary but insufficient for genuine liberation — formal vs. substantive equality, consciousness, liberation, social change

The representation of the world as the world itself is the work of men; they describe it from a point of view that is their own and that they confound with the absolute truth.

Myths chapter, on how male perspective has been universalized as the human perspective, rendering women's experience invisible or derivative — perspective, universalism, male gaze, epistemology

He is the Subject; he is the Absolute. She is the Other.

The culminating formulation of Beauvoir's central concept, drawing on Hegel and Sartre. — alterity, existentialism, power

The problem of woman has always been a problem of men.

Beauvoir's summary of her historical analysis, arguing that women's situation was always determined by male interests and decisions. — patriarchy, history, power

Every time transcendence lapses into immanence, there is degradation of existence into 'in-itself,' of freedom into facticity; this fall is a moral fault if the subject consents to it; if this fall is inflicted on the subject, it takes the form of frustration and oppression; in both cases it is an absolute evil.

Beauvoir's existentialist moral framework, applied to woman's confinement in immanence. — existentialism, freedom, oppression, ethics

What singularly defines the situation of woman is that being, like all humans, an autonomous freedom, she discovers and chooses herself in a world where men force her to assume herself as Other.

The existential paradox at the heart of woman's condition as Beauvoir defines it. — freedom, alterity, situation

Women do not use 'we'; men say 'women,' and women adopt this word to refer to themselves; but they do not posit themselves authentically as Subjects.

Beauvoir's analysis of why women, unlike the proletariat or colonized peoples, have not organized as a collective Subject. — solidarity, collective consciousness, oppression

Refusing to be the Other, refusing complicity with man, would mean renouncing all the advantages an alliance with the superior caste confers on them.

Beauvoir explains why women are complicit in their own subordination—they benefit from proximity to power. — complicity, privilege, liberation

The cult of the Virgin is the rehabilitation of woman by the achievement of her defeat.

A devastating summary of how Christianity exalted woman only by demanding her total submission. — religion, Christianity, patriarchy, myth

The myth of Woman substitutes for an authentic relationship with an autonomous existent the immobile contemplation of a mirage.

Beauvoir's argument that the 'eternal feminine' is a mystification that prevents genuine human encounter. — myth, authenticity, bad faith

She is not only physis but just as much anti-physis; and not only in the civilization of electric permanents, hair waxing, latex girdles, but also in the country of African lip-disk women, in China, and everywhere on earth.

On how women are simultaneously identified with nature and required to overcome it through artifice. — nature, artifice, femininity, beauty

Far from destining herself to man because she thinks she is inferior to him, it is because she is destined for him that, in accepting the idea of her inferiority, she constitutes it.

Beauvoir reverses the usual causal logic of women's subordination in the chapter on the Girl. — education, inferiority, destiny, gender

She perpetuates the immutable species, she ensures the even rhythm of the days and the permanence of the home she guards with locked doors; she is given no direct grasp on the future, nor on the universe.

On the married woman's confinement to immanence and repetition rather than transcendence. — marriage, immanence, domesticity

The mother can have her reasons for wanting a child, but she cannot give to this other—who tomorrow is going to be—his own raisons d'être; she engenders him in the generality of his body, not in the specificity of his existence.

Beauvoir's existentialist argument about the limits of maternity as a form of transcendence. — motherhood, existence, freedom, transcendence

Authentic love must be founded on reciprocal recognition of two freedoms; each lover would then experience himself as himself and as the other; neither would abdicate his transcendence, they would not mutilate themselves; together they would both reveal values and ends in the world.

Beauvoir's positive vision of love as mutual recognition rather than idolatrous submission. — love, freedom, reciprocity, ethics

The same drama of flesh and spirit, and of finitude and transcendence, plays itself out in both sexes; both are eaten away by time, stalked by death, they have the same essential need of the other; and they can take the same glory from their freedom.

The Conclusion's vision of genuine human equality, grounded in shared existential condition. — equality, mortality, freedom, human condition

The word 'love' has not at all the same meaning for both sexes, and this is a source of the grave misunderstandings that separate them.

Opening the chapter on the Woman in Love, Beauvoir diagnoses the fundamental asymmetry of romantic love. — love, gender, asymmetry

What is called mystery is not the subjective solitude of consciousness, or the secret of organic life. The word's true meaning is found at the level of communication: it cannot be reduced to pure silence, to obscurity, to absence; it implies an emerging presence that fails to appear.

Beauvoir's philosophical analysis of the 'mystery' attributed to women—an effect of their silencing, not their nature. — mystery, communication, myth, philosophy

She has always been convinced of male superiority; this male prestige is not a childish mirage; it has economic and social foundations.

Beauvoir on why the girl's deference to men is not irrational but a realistic assessment of power structures. — power, socialization, patriarchy, youth

In today's work, without even mentioning women who work on the land, most working women do not escape the traditional feminine world; neither society nor their husbands give them the help needed to become, in concrete terms, the equals of men.

Beauvoir on the gap between formal equality and lived experience for working women. — work, equality, domesticity, double burden

It is when the slavery of half of humanity is abolished and with it the whole hypocritical system it implies that the 'division' of humanity will reveal its authentic meaning and the human couple will discover its true form.

The Conclusion's climactic vision of a liberated future for both sexes. — liberation, equality, love, humanity